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ABSTRACT
This thesis is a study and analysis of Nazi propaganda, specifically focusing on the
medium of film. Throughout Hitler’s Third Reich, propaganda played a vital role in maintaining
popular support for the party platform in addition to fueling the convictions of the Nazi elite.
There are three main divisions to this study. First, an overview of the structure and organization
of Nazi Germany and particularly The Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda will be
given, followed by an exploration of the origins and evolution of anti-Semitism in the Third
Reich. Last, two Nazi anti-Semitic propaganda films will be analyzed to exemplify the whole of
Nazi propaganda. Specifically, an emphasis will be made that these films played a significant
role in solidifying and sustaining the mentalities and actions desired by the Nazi regime.
Consequently, these films can be correlated to historical events which occurred before and after
1940.
While there are inherent limits on the study of history, this thesis utilizes two films
released in 1940 as primary sources. Despite the language barrier that one would think would
make research difficult, the primary and secondary sources used in this thesis have been
translated and edited in to English. Even so, words can and do have various connotations, thus
one must exercise caution to not take certain quoted material and stretch or add meaning to what
may have actually been meant. Where appropriate, words in both English and German are
included in order to help the reader. This thesis concludes with a broad discussion on the modern
existence of anti-Semitism and what today’s society may learn from Nazi Germany and the
Holocaust.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION TO NAZI GERMANY
“Heil Hitler!” – The Rise of Nazi Germany
Imagine film as a weapon. Certainly, unlike the gun, films do not directly cause
bloodshed and loss of life; however, film can be used in such a way as to prepare and numb a
society for such future actions. This is the case for Nazi Germany and its intricately structured
propaganda machine. This thesis will show how the Nazi Party created this machine and used it
for such purposes. Specifically, this thesis will examine two films released in 1940, Jew Suess
(Jud Suess) and The Eternal Jew (Der ewige Jude), to reveal how Nazi leaders utilized the
medium of film as a conduit to streamline political and anti-Semitic ideas to the German
populace in an effort to solidify preexisting notions and prepare people for the coming atrocities
of the Holocaust.
The term “propaganda” originated in a religious setting in 1622 when Pope Gregory XV
created the Sacred Congregation of Propaganda. This body had the task of spreading Catholicism
in the New World and thwarting Protestantism in Europe, and just over three-hundred years later,
propaganda found in Nazi Germany could be seen as applying to society in a religious sense.
That is, Nazi leaders let their worldview encompass all aspects of life in both their own elite
ranks and that of the ordinary citizen. Randall Bytwerk asserts that propaganda is a necessary
consequence of the flow of technology. Amidst a diversity of media outlets (radio, television,
newspaper, film), propaganda allows governments to easily inform and satisfy citizens. Out of
the many ways to explicitly define the term “propaganda,” Jacques Ellul describes it best as “a
set of methods employed by an organized group that wants to bring about the active or passive
participation in its actions of a mass of individuals, psychologically unified through
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psychological manipulation and incorporated in an organization.’” 1 Interestingly, Bytwerk
makes a valid point by explaining that in propaganda, there is not just an evil propagandist
seeking out an innocent citizen, but instead, there is a citizen who actively seeks propaganda as a
source of information; the propagandist merely satisfies the citizen’s desire. 2
Prior to Hitler and the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP) taking full
control of Germany, the country was run by the democratic Weimar Republic government,
which assumed power in 1919. The specifics of Weimar failures and crises will be discussed
later, but for now, it is important to note the significance of elections and the activities of the
Nazi Party during the Weimar era. In the 1928 elections, the NSDAP received just over 800,000
votes, but by 1932, the number increased to nearly fourteen million. These numbers indicate that
in just four years, the Nazi Party went from receiving three percent to nearly forty percent of the
popular vote. Consequently, the NSDAP became the largest political party in the Reichstag, and
equally important, this shift in politics cleared the way for Hitler’s Chancellorship. 3 Reasonably
enough, one may wonder how the Nazis appealed to so many citizens within such a short period
of time. David Welch asserts that the Nazi Party achieved success because it focused heavily on
integrating the bifurcated middle class. Collectively known as the Mittlestand, the “old middle
class,” made up of farmers, artisans, and small shop owners, and the “new middle class,” made
up of white-collar workers, felt threatened by the economic instability and exceedingly high
unemployment during the Weimar Republic. The Nazis, in turn, were viewed on one hand to be
liberating Germany from capitalism, while on the other hand to be revolutionaries determined to
1

Randall L. Bytwerk, Bending Spines – The Propagandas of Nazi Germany and The German Democratic
Republic (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2004), 3.
2

Ibid., 3-4.
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David Welch, The Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda (New York: Routledge Publishing Co., 1993),

9-10.
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create a new social order. As time progressed in these early years of the Nazi Party, an active and
efficient propaganda machine was developed to help undercut the already weak Weimar
Republic, and as Welch further contends, “What distinguished the NSDAP from other parties in
opposition was its ability to combine the themes of traditional German nationalism with Nazi
ideological motifs.” 4
One of the first propaganda activities of the Nazi Party began in 1925 with the Party
newspaper, the Völkischer Beobachter. Unlike the Weimar political press which released lengthy
articles, the Völkischer Beobachter publications used short phrases filled with over exaggerations
and emphasis on National Socialist subjects such as “the evil of Jewry and Bolshevism, the
humiliation of the Versailles Treaty, [and] the weakness of Weimar parliamentarianism.” All of
these articles were accompanied by popular and effective Nazi slogans, particularly “Ein Volk,
ein Reich, ein Führer” (“One people, one nation, one leader”), that emphasized the key themes
of unity and racial community. 5 In 1928, Hitler appointed the skilled and clever propagandist
Joseph Goebbels to be in charge of all Nazi propaganda efforts. Notably, in the early years of the
Nazi Party, the use of mass communications such as radio, film, television, and newspaper was
absent; however, under the leadership of Goebbels, the Party rapidly increased its use of these
mediums as a result of Hitler and Goebbels’ belief in their value of spreading propaganda to the
masses. 6
On February 1, 1933, just two days after being appointed chancellor by President Paul
von Hindenburg, Adolf Hitler addressed the German people via a radio broadcast. At the top of
his agenda was maintaining Germany’s cultural, religious, and political legacies, and solving
4

Welch, The Third Reich, 15-16.
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Germany’s social and economic problems. Compared to the late 1920s, the favored message of
the Nazi Party was now political consensus, not ideological radicalism. Hitler focused on a
broad, conservative agenda that many Germans supported. Decreasing unemployment, placing
emphasis on Christianity as the basis of moral life, defending family, creating political unity, and
preventing the country from falling into Communist hands were top priorities for Hitler. Notably,
anti-Semitic ideologies were kept to a minimum at this early stage.
Out of widespread fear of a possible Communist uprising, Hitler seized the opportunity
and passed legislation that eradicated civil liberties. With the Reichstag dissolved, Hitler called
for new elections. The February 4, 1933, temporary “Decree for the Protection of the German
People” limited the press and gave police the authority to stop political rallies, thus halting all
election campaigning. This act was followed by a more serious revocation of civil freedoms
subsequent to the February 27 burning of the Reichstag building. While the nature of this fire is
still undetermined, Hitler blamed Communists and used the fire as an opportunity to thwart
political opposition. Thus, the February 28 “Decree for the Protection of the People and the
State” suspended the rights to assembly and free speech and press; powers were also granted to
arrest and imprison political dissidents.
In the last free elections held on March 5, 1933, the Nazi Party received approximately
seventeen million votes (44 percent of total votes). Later in the same month, the Party and its
conservative allies passed an Enabling Act, known formally as the “Law to Remedy the Distress
of the People and the State,” that transferred legislative power to the executive branch, thus
allowing Hitler to enact laws without parliamentary approval. The law passed with disapproval
from only the Social Democratic Party which had just 96 seats out of 441 total Reichstag seats;
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although the Communist Party had 81 seats, it was banned following the election and could not
even vote. 7
Paralleled to these political events were the actions of the paramilitary troopers,
Sturmabteilung (SA), and the elite party bodyguards, Schutzastaffeln (SS). These forces beat and
arrested those deemed to be political opponents of the Nazi Party. By mid March, 1933, SS
leader Heinrich Himmler opened the first concentration camp located at Dachau, near Munich.
By July, this and other similar camps held nearly thirty thousand political prisoners. These police
and military actions coupled with the political events gave way for Hitler’s desired single-party
state where all other parties were either banned or forced into dissolution. 8
The Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda
With full control of Germany nearly complete, the Nazi Party had effectively removed
Weimar democracy and transitioned Germany into a one-party state. Propaganda initially served
as both a vital tool to win over Germans who did not support Hitler and to push onward with
Nazi programs. At each step, propagandists put forth a favorable message of national unity; later
messages not emphasized at this point by the Nazis would come to signify the campaigns that
made possible the persecution of Jews and other groups of undesirables. 9 According to David
Welch, Hitler did not try to hide his dislike for the masses. Hitler was convinced they were
“malleable and corrupt…[and] feminine by nature and attitude.” 10 Hitler even wrote in his 1925
autobiography and political theory book Mein Kampf (My Struggle) that “[p]ropaganda must
always address itself to the broad masses of the people. Propaganda is not meant for the
7

Steven Luckert and Susan Bachrach, State of Deception – The Power of Nazi Propaganda (New York:
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intellectual classes.” 11 Hitler further argued that propaganda must be directed to people through a
“popular form” and that its intellectual content must be fixed at a level that would not go above
the head of the least intellectual member of an audience. The function of propaganda was to
“awaken the imagination of the public through an appeal to its feelings,” 12 and undoubtedly, all
forms of Nazi propaganda abided by this idea and capitalized on the German people’s fear of
enemies undermining the nation’s internal unity and threatening its stability. Hitler believed that
the capacities of the masses were limited; their ability to understand was minimal, and memories
were quick to fade. As such, he wrote that “all effective propaganda must be confined to a few
bare essentials, and these must be expressed as far as possible in stereotyped formulas.” 13
Overall, Hitler’s propaganda aims centered on notions of simplicity, uniformity, concentration,
and repetition. To insure cooperation and agreement, Hitler placed emphasis on reinforcing
propaganda at all levels with fear and threats of violence. 14 By arousing the people’s emotions of
fear, love, hatred, and idealism Hitler and his propaganda machine sought to bring information
and ideologies to the whole German nation. If, however, the message presented to the masses
failed to stay on the course outlined in Mein Kampf, then the effort was sure to fail.
On March 11, 1933, just over a month after coming to power, Hitler established the
Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda. Two days later on March 13, Joseph
Goebbels was appointed to lead the Ministry. The process of forming the Ministry began in early
1933, but because of upcoming elections in March, Hitler decided to postpone the formal
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announcement until shortly after. The Ministry would prove to give Nazi propaganda efforts the
“mark of legality,” and of course, a continued way for the Party to inform and persuade the
masses. 15 President von Hindenberg issued a statement that outlined the purpose of the Ministry
to be a means of “enlightening and propagandizing the people with regard to the policies of the
Reich government and the national reconstruction of the German fatherland.” 16 In effect, a
revolution was underway. With respect to transforming the German people into a body abiding
and agreeing with National Socialist tendencies, little to no violence would be used; instead,
Nazi leaders sought to “transform the nation through a revolution of the spirit.” 17 The task of
aligning the German people together (Gleichschaltung) in common agreement with the new Nazi
worldview (Weltanschauung) was the responsibility of the Ministry. Soon after the Ministry was
established, the press, arts, scientific institutions, and entertainment industry all came under the
influence of Nazi rule. In Mein Kampf, Hitler clearly expected the usefulness of propaganda in
creating a Germany ruled entirely by the Nazi regime, 18 and in the Völkischer Beobachter, Hitler
further proclaimed that “decontamination” of Germany was of utmost priority. To achieve such a
goal, “the whole educational system, theater, film, literature, the press, and broadcasting” were to
fall subservient to Nazi principles for the overall hope of maintaining “the eternal values” of
Germany. 19 Nazi propaganda sought to rally the citizenry ideologically. That is, by introducing
the idea of a German community and consciousness in addition to German superiority over other
groups of people, propaganda would help form attitudes in a society awakened by the most basic
15

Welch, Propaganda and the German Cinema, 9.
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of instincts, primarily fear, but also accompanied by idealism and the hope for a new society that
would rectify the crises of the previous two decades. 20
The burning of thousands of supposedly anti-Nazi books and pamphlets throughout
Germany in March, 1933, represented the beginning of an era of state censorship and control of
nearly all forms of public and cultural life. Speaking in Berlin, Goebbels put forth his gratitude
for the people taking part in the burning and asserted that “‘[o]ut of these ashes the phoenix of a
new age will rise.’” 21 These book burnings paralleled the push to gain control of the press and
media outlets. Through the “Editors Law” of October 4, 1933, the organization responsible for
admitting people into these professions was to keep track of the racial purities of workers,
thereby effectively preventing those judged to have any degree of “Jewish blood” from entering
the professions. Furthermore, Clause 14 of the law made clear the requirement of writers and
editors to omit information that could weaken the Reich, either domestically or abroad. 22 From
Berlin, the Ministry even went to the extent of issuing daily directives issued to propaganda
offices throughout Germany outlining what stories and information could or could not be
released to the public. Those in media and press outlets faced being fired or sent to concentration
camps if they did not comply with the Nazi directives. Ironically, Goebbels, previously a
journalist, wrote in his own diary, “‘Any man who still has a residue of honor will be very
careful not to become a journalist.’” 23
Goebbels and his Ministry took control of the arts by ruling which artists and what
content could be made available to the public. “Degenerate art” was banned, and Nazi-approved
20

Hoffman, The Triumph of Propaganda, 91-92.

21

Luckert and Bachrach, State of Deception, 67.
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Ibid., 68.
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“völkisch art” was permitted and embraced for its value to German culture. Hitler was insistent
that all culture came from the Aryan. Phrases such as “German culture,” “German blood,” and
“the German national community” explicitly made anything or anyone not deemed German to be
an outcast and undesirable. Only true Germans were believed to possess the noble virtues of
“cleanliness, discipline, courage, the spirit of sacrifice, loyalty, [and] honor;” 24 the motto “Meine
Ehre heiβt Treue” (“Loyalty is my honor”) was even inscribed on the belt buckle of every man in
the Schutzstaffel. Such captivating phrases and ideas were used in propaganda to “prepare the
nation for Hitler’s wars of conquest [and] to justify them as legitimate acts of defense.” 25
Director of the Ministry’s Broadcasting Department Eugen Hadomovsky believed that he
and his workers were “the SA of propaganda.” 26 Just as the SA openly roamed the streets and
visited any house it wished, those involved with Reich radio broadcasting saw their work in a
similar light as they, too, entered the streets and homes of nearly every German and effectively
spread National Socialist ideas. It is important to note that not all broadcasts were explicit
political propaganda; Goebbels actually reserved significant amounts of time for entertainment
programs. With many Germans purchasing the cheap “people’s receivers” (Volksempfänger), the
nation became the second largest radio audience in the world. In addition to the prevalence of
these radios in most homes, businesses, and restaurants, Nazi officials also made used of
loudspeakers in public gathering spots. These speakers were used for “national moments” which
sought to “forge bonds of patriotic unity” by promoting communal listening. 27 Though the Nazi
Party exerted control over nearly all mediums of art and communication and unquestionably
24

Hoffman, The Triumph of Propaganda, 92.
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communicated their messages to the German public in an effective manner, the use of film would
prove to yield the most striking forms of Nazi propaganda.
Nationalization of the German Film Industry
Prior to 1927, the Nazi Party realized the potential of film propaganda, but had little
experience in production and funds for such endeavors were minimal. Films produced up to this
year were mainly compilations of party gatherings and marches. In 1927, however, the tide of
Nazi film propaganda shifted. In that year, Alfred Hugenberg, head of the conservative German
National People’s Party (DNVP), purchased Ufa (Unversum-Film-Aktiengesellschaft), the
country’s largest and most celebrated film company. From here on, NSDAP activities were
recorded by Ufa and shown to the German public. In 1932, regional film offices
(Landesfilmstellen) were created to distribute Party films while the Film Service (Filmamt) was
in charge of film production. By fall of 1932, Goebbels had successfully centered all film
activities under his control in Berlin. During these years, the film industry continued to suffer
from economic turmoil, bankruptcy, and dwindling attendance figures. The film industry
responded by adopting the SPIO-Plan of 1932. Under the direction of SPIO, the industry’s main
representative body, this plan sought to form an agreement among all sectors involved in the
industry while maintaining its traditional structure. Yet by early 1933, the Nazi effort to organize
and centralize the film industry undermined the German Cinema Owners’ Association by getting
Adolf Engl elected as head of the Association; Engl was also leader of the Nazi Film Theatre
Cells, the Nazi’s own professional film association. Consequently, the Nazis had successfully
infiltrated one of their own into the industry and guaranteed that Nazi influences would permeate
the entire industry from that point onward. 28
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In effect, the Nazi takeover of the German Cinema Owners’ Association began what
would be a “plethora of complex laws, decrees and intricate state machinery” designed to
achieve conformity of the industry and public, consequently helping the Party achieve
coordination (Gleichschaltung) of the cinema industry. Although Goebbels was realistic and
believed in the idea that the industry would not respond favorably to extremism, those seeking to
use radical measures to help achieve control over the film industry accomplished their goal;
Engl’s election to the Association brought the resignation of every other member on the board.
By May, 1933, the Nazi Party banned all trade unions, and the film industry’s trade union
DACHO (Dach-Organisation der Filmschaffenden Deutschlands e.V.) disbanded and became
part of the only trade union allowed under Nazi control, the German Labour Front (Deutsche
Arbeitsfront). 29
Given the importance of the medium in possible propaganda success, as the Nazis
assumed full control in Germany they intensified their focus on reformation of the film industry.
By the summer of 1933, the Nazis had created the Reich Film Chamber (Reichsfilmkammer,
RFK), and on September 22, 1933, Goebbels “decided to extend the idea to the whole of German
life” and thus created the Reich Chamber of Culture (Reichskulturkammer, RKK). In all, the
RKK was made up of seven Chambers (Kammern): film, literature, theatre, music, fine arts,
press, and radio. The creation of the RKK illustrates the efforts made to coordinate not only a
nation’s film industry, but the whole of social and cultural life. As David Welch points out,
however, these efforts did not achieve exactly what Goebbels and Hitler hoped for with respect
to the film industry – “harmonization of all branches of the industry” – but it did succeed in

29

Welch, Propaganda and the German Cinema, 9.
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restricting personal and artistic freedoms. 30 To alleviate any misgivings the Nazis faced from the
industry, Goebbels created the private, limited-liability company Filmkreditbank (FKB) to
provide credit and financing for the industry; however, the FKB was just another Nazi arm
helping the Party achieve its control of the film industry. In fact, the FKB could refuse to finance
a film until it conformed to the standards and expectations of the Nazi Party. An additional
function of the RFK was the removal of all “degenerate” artists and employees from the industry,
given the policy that only “true” Germans could take part in such activities. Curt Belling, an
ardent Nazi supporter, claimed that “70 per cent of all scripts were written by Jews; almost 50
per cent of directors working in Germany were Jewish; and 70 per cent of all production
companies were owned by Jews.” 31 Welch, however, reports that these statistics are an over
exaggeration of the actual Jewish influence in the film industry. One may conclude, therefore,
that the Nazis might have hoped that such figures would inflame and stir up hatred against
Jews. 32
To further limit any anti-Nazi backlash as a result of their control over the film industry
and to extend his influence even more over the industry, Goebbels proclaimed the “Reich
Cinema Law” in February, 1934. Instead of just preventing “bad” films from being produced,
this law promoted “good” films, too. Such effort was achieved in three ways: “a compulsory
script censorship, an increase in the number of provisions which…might ban a film, and a
greatly enlarged system of distinction marks (Prädikate).” 33 Perhaps the most important aspect
of this legislation was the creation of a pre-censor (Vorensor) who was an official of the Ministry
30

Welch, Propaganda and the German Cinema, 10.

31
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33
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called the Reich Film Director (Reichsfilmdramaturg) and functioned at a film’s pre-production
stages. That is, a producer was required to submit a brief overview of the film’s plot, and if the
plot passed screening, then the full script of the film could be written and submitted for further
review. Only after both stages were passed could a film actually begin production. 34 By the midthirties, this office also helped to create an industry nearly free of any Jewish influence. 35 While
the “Reich Cinema Law” sought to promote “positive” films, the system of distinction marks
was in reality a form of negative control and taxation. Prior to this law, it was considered an
honor for a film to be given distinction marks; such awards even allowed film companies to
receive tax deductions. With the law enacted, however, the old system remained in place, but
with the added requirement that any film hoping to be shown in public must receive some form
of distinction marks. Examples of award titles included: “Politically valuable…Artistically
valuable…Valuable for Youth…[and] Nationally valuable.” 36 In their relevance to propaganda,
these distinction marks were actually a means of informing the audiences on the content of a
particular film. For instance, Leni Riefenstahl’s Triumph of the Will (1935) and Wolfgang
Liebeneiner’s I Accuse (1941) both received the award “Politically valuable” for their assumed
value in the areas of rallying German spirit and rationalizing euthanasia programs, respectively. 37
As one further point illustrating the Nazi control over life in German, Goebbels banned all forms
of art criticism in late 1936, limiting critics to writing merely “‘descriptive reviews.’” 38
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Complete nationalization and centralization of the German film industry neared
completion in January, 1942, when all film studios were absorbed into the newly formed
organization Ufa-Film GmbH (referred to as Ufi to distinguish it from the older Ufa studios).
Aristotle Kallis writes that there are two ways of interpreting the formation of Ufi. On one hand,
Ufi represents the peak of a step-by-step process of intentional centralization and ideological
takeover of the film industry. Alternatively, one can just as easily view the formation of Ufi as a
result of the transition from peace to wartime. That is, the outbreak of World War II “released
the regime from the burden of accountability,” consequently allowing Nazi leaders to pursue and
achieve long-term goals in a matter of months, versus slowly transitioning the industry to be
controlled by the Nazi Party. While Kallis admits that deciphering the exact cause of the final act
of the “nazification” of the film industry “remains a moot point,” he notes that January, 1942,
was a “real turning point” for the Nazi regime. 39 As will be discussed in the next chapter, the
ideological radicalization of anti-Semitism in Germany took momentous leaps in the summer of
1941 and early 1942. The Party’s actions to nationalize the film industry correlate with the
process of strengthening and escalating violence against Jews. That is, “for both economic and
political reasons,” supervising and monitoring closely the film industry at all stages of
production was vital in order to propagate ideology and insure propaganda success. 40 In the end,
Goebbels and his Ministry officials found themselves in a position to “wield substantial power
and influence” through the medium of film. Given the relatively smooth coordination of the
industry as a result of measures leading up to the creation of Ufi, Goebbels and his Propaganda
Ministry seemed unstoppable. As history would tell, however, the Nazi Party would have a

39
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World War on its hands, and despite propaganda efforts to build and maintain an undying
German spirit, the United States and its allies would prove to be the ultimate victors in stopping
Nazi Germany from being successful. 41
Interestingly, there exists a debate among scholars as to what amount of German films
produced under the Third Reich were actually propagandistic in nature. Historian David Hull
believes that “no more than twenty-five per cent” of such movies actually contained propaganda
messages. This number is arrived at by including explicitly propagandistic films and reasoning
that some producers even got away with not following Nazi rules, thus releasing films that were
valued solely for entertainment quality. In contrast to this position is Erwin Leiser’s argument
that all films released during the Third Reich contained some degree of propaganda. By
dissolving the distinction between entertainment and political films, Leiser insists that “even
escapist films contained Nazi ideals or at least served to lull German audiences into
forgetfulness.” 42 These arguments bring up a vital idea to consider. As historians analyzing the
past, we must not judge and divide in such a way as to forget the complexities of the past.
Essentially, both Hull and Leiser pose valid assessments of film during the Third Reich, and
perhaps this discussion is better served by admitting that, quite possibly, the reality was a
combination of the two sides. The Nazi regime was surely determined to objectify its worldview,
but as David Weinberg points out, “[b]ecause it was irrational, it was necessary for the regime to
control every aspect of reality.” In essence, films, with their intrinsic ability to “distort reality
and to mesmerize audiences,” proved extremely valuable to the success of the Nazi propaganda
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machine. 43 The apparent commitment of the Nazi regime to Aryanization suggests that ideology
played a significant part in shaping film policies. To the Ministry, economy and propaganda
success were linked in the sense that by producing films with messages aligned with ideals of
National Socialism, especially the ideas of German unity and the purity of German blood, people
would “again flock to movie theatres and German film-making would thrive.” 44
Public Response to Nazi Propaganda
So how did the German public respond to Nazi propaganda measures? To obtain this
information, the Nazi Party utilized two forms of population sampling: Party reports and SD
reports. Undoubtedly, propaganda success on a total population scale can be easily achieved if
leaders know what the public thinks and feels about official government ideas and actions;
however, one must admit that, in a totalitarian state, the ease with which people readily divulge
their true beliefs is lessened. By 1938, Party reports often labeled as “Political Situation Reports”
or “Morale Reports” contained information that was relayed to the central leadership both
monthly and weekly, depending on the importance and relevance of the content. Weekly regional
reports incorporated information obtained from offices such as the Propaganda Department and
Department for Peasants. One thing was certain, the Nazi elite demanded and emphasized the
importance of regular collection and reporting of information to gauge current public sentiments.
The end of most reports contained information and evaluations of propaganda measures. The
first portion of these sections contained information on local and regional office activities and
efforts to distribute propaganda to the masses. The remaining portion contained “‘reviews’” of
propaganda and the effectiveness of such efforts. 45
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In most cases, the reports portrayed Party activities favorably; the few negative
comments were usually accompanied with extensive detail. Overall, one must consider the Party
Reports carefully given the plausible argument that people living in a totalitarian state do not “air
their doubts and criticisms of the regime in the presence of its representatives.” 46 Furthermore,
those functionaries writing and distributing the reports may have only reported positive
sentiment, considering the notion that their jobs were to instill in the masses positive attitudes
toward the Nazis actions and ideas. In essence, their job successes would be judged by higher
authorities directly from information compiled in the reports, and given the belief of some
historians that high ranking Nazi officials sometimes edited, omitted, and even deliberately
translocated pieces of one regional report to another region’s report, one may find it difficult to
assess the true state of public opinion by using Party Reports. As Unger reasonably notes,
reading these reports may even cause one to believe that public opinion remained unchanged
throughout World War II, even in the face of defeat. 47
The SD reports, however, reflect the ups and downs of the masses “closely and, on the
whole, plausibly.” 48 Contrasted to general statements made in Party Reports such as “the mood is
good,” SD reports sought to validate their claims with direct quotations from those people
sampled. Generally speaking, the SD had fewer motives for hiding any unpleasant truths
obtained from sampling the public versus the Nazi Party functionaries. Although inherently
difficult to cast any certainty on this issue, Unger believes that the impression gained from
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reading the SD reports is that the “SD allowed few inhibitions to stand in the way in presenting
its picture of public opinion that was wholly unadorned and, for the Nazi leadership, often highly
unflattering.” 49 The difference between Party and SD Reports can best be seen in propaganda
reporting. While both incidental and deliberate changes were made to even minor criticisms in
Party Reports by the time they reached the high command, SD reports did not hesitate to unveil
the shortcomings of propaganda. By January 1943, SD reports noted that the general public was
“‘against all propaganda’” as a result of its “‘overbearing and boastful character.’” 50 An SD
report released several months later in 1943 stated that people were tired and sickened by the
anti-Jewish campaign. The existence of two opposite institutions of public reporting gives
credence to the argument that analyzing and gaining credible information from opinion reporting
is minimal. At the same time, however, reporting in the Third Reich as revealed through matterof-fact SD reporting allows historians to draw more valid and logical conclusions on the state of
public attitudes versus the unreliable Party Reports. Perhaps just as important is the idea that as a
result of reported public distaste for Nazi propaganda, especially in the later years of Nazi rule,
one may agree with the suggestion that not all Germans were in fact staunch Nazi supporters.
This is not to say that Germans were blind of the actions being perpetrated by the Nazis, but
realistically, it seems far-fetched to conclude that all German citizens supported the Nazi Party in
all of its policies.
Myth & Credibility
With control over nearly all mass media and cultural institutions achieved by the Nazi’s
propaganda machine, how did they maintain credibility and support? To begin answering this
question, one can view the two myths of Der Führer (the Leader) and the Volksgemeinschaft (the
49
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national community) as the primary means of keeping the German public interconnected with the
objectives of the Nazi Party. In the 1920s, Hitler was the leader of the Nazi Party, but once
control of Germany was achieved, he became the leader of all Germans. The “Heil Hitler”
expression and the arm salute known even in today’s society signified allegiance to Hitler’s
Germany. Anyone not conforming to these standards stood in opposition to the Nazi Party and its
political and social goals. Success in foreign and domestic social affairs increased Hitler’s
popularity. For instance, the regaining of territory lost as a result of World War I and the Treaty
of Versailles and the gaining of Austria and the Sudetenland in 1938 contributed to boosting
German pride. Propaganda claimed Hitler “initiated the rebirth of Germany” and remedied
Weimar era failures and embarrassments. Propaganda contrasting grave economic conditions
such as high inflation and unemployment coupled with the shame of the Versailles Treaty
experienced during Weimar Germany made Hitler’s Germany favorable for many citizens. Hitler
was portrayed as a savior of the German people, a man working to build a national community
built upon principles of racial, cultural, and social harmonies. Interrelated with the Hitler myth
was that of the Volksgemeinschaft. Given the Weimar failures and World War I defeat, some
Germans yearned for renewed strength, harmony, and order. Others chose to view the prospect
favorably because of the promise to provide Germany with newfound stability and pride. Thus,
from both retrospective and futuristic motivations, the hope of creating a national community
was favored by German citizens. Rectifying inequalities within Germany’s economic classes
while removing those unwanted as members of the racially defined nation (Volk) was a well
received notion, especially by younger Germans and those born after 1900. 51 In reflecting on his
observations of the German youth in 1937, British historian Stephen Roberts admitted, “‘It is this
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utter lack of any objective or critical attitude on the part of youth, even with university students,
that made me fear the most for the future of Germany. They are nothing but vessels for State
propaganda.’” 52
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CHAPTER 2
NAZI ANTI-SEMITISM
Setting the Stage
To Hitler, war was “less a struggle among nations than a fight to the finish pitting Aryan
against Jew,” or as Hermann Göring declared in October, 1941, “‘This is not the Second World
War, this is the Great Racial War.’” 53 After the outbreak of World War II, Goebbels stated to his
subordinates that “‘propaganda does not have anything to do with truth! We serve truth by
serving a German victory.’” 54 Jay Baird writes that “the genius of Hitler and Goebbels was to
merge the themes of traditional German patriotism with Nazi ideological motifs.” 55 Thus, given
the description of the Jew as the single greatest enemy of Nazi Germany, propaganda about them
was meant to arouse the fears of Germans, thereby helping the argument that a “solution” was
needed to solve “Jewish question.”
Determining who was and was not a “national comrade” (Volksgenossen) became a key
issue not only for government bureaucrats and police officials, but for propagandists, too.
Propaganda disseminated the proper state approved information on this issue to the public and
justified measures taken against these “‘outsiders:’” Gypsies, homosexuals, political opponents,
allegedly genetically inferior Germans (those with mental or physical disabilities), and above all
others, Jews. In part, propagandists relied on preexisting hatred and stereotypes to depict Jews as
an “‘alien race’” that behaved like parasites. By feeding off the host, Jews “poisoned its [the host
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nation] culture, seized its economy, and enslaved its workers and farmers.” 56 Such notions
repeatedly appeared in state-supported ideology. Nazis also put forward the risks to racial purity
and national health associated with “‘mixing’” German and Jewish blood; some scholars at
leading universities even provided “objective” research to give anti-Semitism and anti-Semitic
propaganda credibility, while some religious leaders did the same by incorporating anti-Semitic
ideas into sermons. During times of sheer violence directed towards Jews, propaganda helped
create in Germans attitudes of tolerance, passivity, and acceptance of the measures. The first
major anti-Jewish action occurred on April 1, 1933, with the boycott of Jewish businesses.
Propagandists called the action a response to atrocity stories spread by “‘world Jewry; ’” the
propaganda, however, was not entirely successful as many Germans continued to visit the
businesses. 57
Propaganda also helped to spread acceptance of the “Nuremberg Laws” passed in
September, 1935. These two laws came as a result of the German public’s distaste for direct
violence towards Jews committed by radicals of the Nazi Party. The “Law for the Protection of
German Blood and Honor” banned marriage and sexual relations between Jews and German
blooded individuals. The “Reich Citizenship Law” prevented persons who were not German
blooded from being recognized as German citizens. A later supplementary decree to the
“Nuremberg Laws” made in November, 1935, established the “Mischlinge Test” which
attempted to define who was either Jewish or mixed blooded depending on the number of Jewish
grandparents an individual had in his or her family. The “Nuremberg Laws,” therefore, were
significant in that they formalized legal restrictions on Jews and made apparent the initial
sentiments which would pave the way for further actions that would occur during Hitler’s reign.
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Interestingly, some Jews and non-Jews believed the “Nuremberg Laws” would restore order in
Germany. 58 As for Hitler, he justified these laws as “the only way of heading off the likelihood
of spontaneous ‘defensive actions of the enraged population.’” 59 Thus, it is possible that Hitler
actually meant to separate himself from the unpopular radical actions committed by Nazi Party
functionaries, therefore giving him legitimacy through the veil of legal justification.
David Bankier asserts that for many Germans, the law was more of “an assault” on the
black-white-red imperial flag, as the law made the Swastika banner the new German flag, and
was less important for its ostracizing of Jews. Dissolving the idea of Jews as German citizens
was seen as “an obvious and absolutely natural measure,” not because of indifference to the
“Jewish Question,” but out of “tacit consent to the Nazi solution” and agreement with the idea of
“isolating and removing Jews from the Volksgemeinschaft.” 60 The “Law for the Protection of
German Blood and Honor” was positively received as it confined anti-Jewish actions to the
“framework of law and order;” no longer would mob violence be permissible. District reporting
throughout Germany even claimed that peace was indeed restored to an acceptable level after the
passage of the “Nuremberg Laws.” 61 Still yet, a small number of people opposed the laws for
fear of international boycott and retaliation. Overall, though, the “Nuremberg Laws” were widely
accepted for the racial policy contained within as well as the establishment of a framework for
limiting violent anti-Semitic activities. 62

58

Luckert and Bachrach, State of Deception, 89-90.

59

Ian Kershaw, The “Hitler Myth” – Image and Reality in the Third Reich (New York: Oxford University
Press Inc., 1987), 236.
60

David Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution – Public Opinion Under Nazism (Cambridge:
Blackwell Publishers, 1992), 76-77.
61

Ibid.

62

Ibid., 79.

27

Intensification of Anti-Semitism in Nazi Germany
The night of November 9, 1938, marked a significant change in the pace of anti-Jewish
measures when the Nazis initiated a full night and day of nationwide pogroms against Jews in
response to the assassination of a German diplomat in France by a Jewish refugee. SA and SS
men disguised as civilians took to the streets and destroyed over 7,000 Jewish businesses and
burned hundreds of synagogues. In the process, the Gestapo (State Secret Police) arrested nearly
thirty thousand Jewish males and transported them to various concentration camps. After “The
Night of Broken Glass” (Kristallnacht), the rate of Jewish emigration increased rapidly. As
expected, propaganda releases following Kristallnacht portrayed the night as “‘spontaneous
outrage’” of the German people against the Jews for the terrorist and world Jewry linked
assassination of the German diplomat, Ernst vom Rath. Furthermore, the Ministry made efforts
to link a 1936 murder of a Party official in Switzerland by a Jew to the vom Rath murder,
thereby providing multiple examples establishing and proving the supposed Jewish campaign
against Germany. In reality, however, the assassin, Herschel Grynszpan, acted alone in response
to the government’s deportation of his parents into Poland. Nevertheless, the press was ordered
to announce punishments against the Jews as a result of Kristallnacht, including a fine of one
billion Reichsmarks to be paid to the government for damages. In terms of international reaction
to these events, the public opinion of U.S. citizens turned against Germany. Nearly all media
outlets rejected claims that the violence was a result of German outrage. President Franklin D.
Roosevelt even withdrew the U.S. ambassador from Germany and publicly stated his disproval
of the violence. Yet, in response to mounting international disapproval of the anti-Jewish
violence, Nazis tried to shift people’s attention to British and American atrocities. 63 Despite this,
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though, non-Jewish Germans, for the first time, sensed a “real danger.” Such treatment of Jews
even stirred those who supported “‘moderate’” anti-Semitic measures; a small number of people
even wrote to the British Embassy expressing their shame for the violent events. 64
Selling the War
Germany invaded Poland on September 1, 1939. The ensuing World War would bring
suffering of mammoth proportions. Following the invasion of the Soviet Union in the summer of
1941, Nazi anti-Jewish measures took the great radical turn to genocide. To present the invasion
of Poland as a justified act of defense, propaganda put forth stories of “Polish atrocities,” both
real and alleged acts of discrimination and violence against ethnic Germans in Poland. The Reich
Press Office even forbade the press from using the word “war.” Instead, they were to describe
the events as if the German military had fought back Polish attacks, thus giving credibility to
Germany’s actions as a defense in response to being the “victim of aggression.” 65 The invasion
was completed in just one month, and in its wake, the SS paramilitary death squads known as the
Einsatzgruppen followed behind military forces and brutally murdered tens of thousands of
Polish civilians. In the grand scheme of genocide, these forces were the first to perpetrate murder
on a large scale. In an effort to justify their actions, German officials told even more atrocity
stories, one of which was where “fifty-eight thousand” ethnic Germans were allegedly murdered
by Polish civilian and military personnel. These figures, however, were a gross exaggeration
used to inflame passions and provide justification for the Nazi’s own extensive murder
campaign. In reality, between five and six thousand ethnic Germans were murdered. Overall,
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propagandists convinced Germans that the invasion of Poland was justified, and for some
Germans, propaganda “reinforced deep-seated anti-Polish sentiment.” 66
Propaganda was most effective when the German military experienced victory over
enemies. Between 1939 and 1942, Germany’s military forces seemed nearly unstoppable,
especially with the swift defeat of France in June, 1940. Despite the setback of the Battle of
Britain in 1940, propaganda materials reinforced Hitler’s excellence and the invincibility of
Germany’s military. 67 From 1939 until October, 1941, the official Nazi anti-Jewish policy was
that of forced emigration. War, however, limited the ability of Jews to leave Germany, as
potential relocation venues restricted immigration. Therefore, some Nazi leaders believed that
Jewish populations could be placed in ghettos in occupied Poland. While propaganda publicly
conveyed forced emigration to be the solution to the “Jewish Question,” efforts to portray Jews
as demon creatures and disease-carrying rats persisted. In an attempt to prepare the public for
harsher anti-Jewish measures, namely deportation to ghettos, Jews were depicted as a health
threat who transmitted diseases, therefore necessitating their quarantine. Ironically, ghettos soon
filled beyond capacity and became the breeding grounds for the diseases the Jews were said to
have been carriers of in the first place. 68
The Holocaust
Following the beginning of the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the Nazis pursued a
path to genocide in the East, with propaganda functioning by “inciting hatred, justifying
atrocities, and preparing the German population to accept or support ever harsher measures
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against Jews and others in occupied territories and in Germany.” 69 The Nazi elite saw war
against the Soviet Union as a “‘war of extermination,’” and a struggle against an opposing
ideology. Propagandists also produced materials to educate military and police units with hatred
against the Soviet Communist Party and the “‘Jewish Bolshevik commissar.’” 70 By emphasizing
the link between European Jews and Communism, the image of the Jew as “‘the enemy’”
determined to destroy German was reinforced. Propaganda officials were even attached to
military units with orders to focus on Red Army “‘atrocities and infringements of international
law.’” 71 One such description of commissars stated that “‘[i]t would be an insult to animals if
one were to call the features of these largely Jewish tormentors of people bestial. They are the
embodiment of the infernal, and have become the personification of insane hatred of everything
that is noble humanity.’” 72 By late summer 1941, German forces shifted from killing men to
eradicating whole families regardless of sex or age. By fall of the same year, the shift of antiJewish policies to genocidal actions pervaded the Reich, as persecution and deportation were
escalated within Germany. By late 1941 and into early 1942, deportations of Jews to
concentration campus began. The formal resolution to murder European Jews was announced at
the Wannsee Conference on January 20, 1942, to high level Nazi officials who were to be
intimately involved with the “Final Solution.” Although Goebbels was not at the meeting, he
noted in his diary that in the ghettos, “‘These [Jews] are no longer human beings; they are
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animals. For this reason, our task is no longer humanitarian but surgical. We must cut here, and
quite invasively; otherwise Europe will perish from the Jewish disease.’” 73
To the Nazis, war literally meant “‘life or death;’” either Germany or the Jews would
perish. When Hitler took power in 1933, there was no plan to kill millions of Jews. Instead, the
Party began with legal and other acceptable means to negatively impact Jewish life in Germany.
Though half of the 600,000 Jews in Germany in 1933 were eventually expelled, the acquisition
of Poland added nearly two million more Jews to German control. Undoubtedly, this fact
troubled Nazi leaders, but the possibility of invading Russia exacerbated the problem to its peak,
as millions of more Jews would soon be brought to Nazi control. The “war against
‘subhumans,’” therefore, was easier to carryout given the context and conditions. 74
The possibility of the Nazis actually perpetrating genocide would not become clear until
the beginning of 1939. Undoubtedly, it was clear that the Nazis hated Jews, but as Randall
Bytwerk asserts, “their rhetoric did not lead average Germans (or the rest of the world) to expect
genocide.” 75 January 30, 1939, brought a chilling statement to the forefront of Germany’s
confrontation with Jews. In a speech to the Reichstag, Hitler made what he called a prophecy and
boldly stated, “‘If international finance Jewry within Europe and abroad should succeed once
more in plunging the peoples into a world war, then the consequence will be not the
Bolshevization of the world and therewith a victory of Jewry, but on the contrary, the destruction
of the Jewish race in Europe.’” 76 While the meaning of this statement was not clear at the time,
Hitler’s repeated error in later speeches of attributing the prophecy to the night of September 1,
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1939, instead of January 30, is important. The prediction of the destruction of Jews may be taken
differently if made during the context of war. Bytwerk reasons that “the word ‘destruction’ takes
on a physical connotation missing in peace,” thus showing that Hitler meant his threat seriously.
In their effort to communicate Nazi thinking to citizens, leaders made propagandists use the
words “destroy (vernichten), wipe out (auslöschen), exterminate (ausrotten), and extirpate
(ausmerzen).” 77
Bytwerk stresses that the reaction of the German people to anti-Semitic propaganda was
indifference rather than internalization. Communication within the Party constantly admitted
worry about the lack of ardent anti-Semitism within the German public. Some believe that the
near constant emphasis on Jews as enemy number one had a numbing effect. In short, most
Germans could shift their everyday attentions to other things, and they did. 78 Furthermore, the
Führer’s popularity helped the German people to believe uncritically the so-called struggle
against the power of world Jewry. This, in turn, ensured at least a degree of passivity among the
German people, thus providing the Nazis with a great degree of autonomy to carryout
increasingly radical measures in the war against Jews. 79 Despite the pervasiveness of Nazi
propaganda and its undeniable ability to create, solidify, and confirm anti-Semitic attitudes, Ian
Kershaw observes that most Germans’ attitudes toward Jews was discriminatory and did not
match the attitudes held by Hitler, Goebbels, and other Nazi leaders. In essence, anti-Semitism
was of “secondary importance” in shaping the popular opinion of Germans. 80 Even SD reports
released after Hitler repeated his January 30, 1939 “prophecy” on January 30, 1942, state that his
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words were interpreted to mean that the war against Jews “would be followed through to the end
with merciless consistency,” and that the existence of Jews in Europe would end in the near
future. Notably, however, the prophecy was not the main topic of interest, as the SD reports also
mention that information on the war situation in the east was of primary interest to the public.
Further evidence that anti-Semitism was of background importance to the general public comes
from SD reports released after Hitler yet again repeated his “prophecy” at least five times over a
one year period between 1942 and 1943; the reports make no mention of any public reaction to
the passage. 81
The Jews Are Guilty…Of Everything!
Interestingly, the Nazis believed that World War II and the conspiracies of world Jewry
were, in fact, one in the same; the connection was “causal and necessary and thus by implication
not an accident of timing and geography.” 82 In other words, World War II as we know it was
seen by Nazis as an “apocalyptic battle” against the forces of world Jewry. As the Nazi elite saw
it, Germany’s actions were a justified defense to atrocities committed by countries under the
control of Jews. The ultimate escalation of action from persecution to murder was paralleled by
radicalized propaganda about Jews. Hitler portrayed himself as a prophet; he concluded that the
beginning of a new war would provide tangible evidence that a cohesive and international Jewish
force had indeed set out to destroy Germany. In turn, Germany had to be protected and European
Jewry destroyed before achieving the goal of totally destroying Germany. 83

81

Kershaw, The “Hitler Myth,” 244-245.

82

Jeffrey Herf, The Jewish Enemy – Nazi Propaganda During World War II and The Holocaust
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 1.
83

Herf, The Jewish Enemy, 5-9.

34

Evidence in the media to this shift of attention to Jews over time is easily seen in posters
(Word of the Week) placed for viewing on street corners and other public places. From 1936 to
1940, anti-Semitic themes were rare, but by 1941, about a quarter of posters included such
content. While the presence of such content increased over time, the total percentage of antiSemitic propaganda seems to have remained low as a result of Hitler and Goebbels’ desire to
keep the public from being overly informed on the current actions taking place in the
concentration camps. 84 Nazi propaganda often focused on the “supposed Jewish domination of
German professional life, despite the conflicting reality.” 85 Jews made up between less than one
percent to just over ten percent of any given profession, and in the Reichstag, less than twenty of
the nearly six-hundred members were Jewish. 86 Thus, the Nazi claim of a Jewish conspiracy, in
reality, had no true foundation. The propaganda measures and rhetoric disseminated to the
German public was not, as Jeffrey Herf describes, “a consensus in support of mass murder;”
instead, this anti-Semitic foundation built in the 1930s permitted a pool of “public hatred,
contempt, and indifference” toward Jews. Such attitudes allowed Nazi leaders to proceed
forward with the “Final Solution.” 87
In the Darkness of the Death Camps
By winter of 1942, all main Nazi concentration camps had started operations. In speeches
and on the radio, Hitler repeated his intent to “‘exterminate’” and “‘annihilate’” all of Europe’s
Jews. Posters containing anti-Semitic materials increased, but interestingly, press headlines of
such stories actually declined. Within just a few years, the Nazis had achieved great success in
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their “Final Solution” to the “Jewish Question.” As Jeffrey Herf writes, the Nazis “murdered
with breathtaking speed.” 88 Throughout the Nazi’s genocidal campaign, not a word of the
murders was leaked through the press. Instead, propaganda sought to capitalize on preformed
anti-Semitism as well as make use of Hitler and Goebbels as authoritative and inspirational
figures. Furthermore, Nazis withheld true German casualty numbers by grossly underestimating
the figures to public audiences; Goebbels cited in his diary that it was “‘not opportune to give
these numbers to the public. We’ll wait for a more favorable moment.’” 89 At no time during the
war did Goebbels deny what the regime was doing to Jews and other undesirables; instead, he
deceptively turned such accusations into “unspecified atrocity stories…and then changed the
subject.” 90
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CHAPTER 3
FILM ANALYSES
Jew Suess
One type of film the Nazis produced was the so-called “historical film.” By using actual
historical persons and events, the Nazis claimed to accurately portray reality and capture factual
attitudes. The receptivity of the German public to the negative images of Jews as “sly,
hypocritical, deceitful, and morally repugnant” in Jew Suess shows that previous anti-Semitic
propaganda efforts made by Nazis were to a degree successful and allowed the public to view
such sentiments as truths with relevance to pertinent social and political issues of the day. 91
Professor of film studies Eric Rentschler writes that Jew Suess is Nazi cinema’s most
debated and challenged film of the Third Reich. Rivaled only by The Eternal Jew, Jew Suess still
possesses the ability to “‘ignite fierce passions.’” 92 Jew Suess, as Rentschler asserts, undoubtedly
helped prepare the German public for future actions of deportation and genocide perpetrated by
Germany. One day after its September 24, 1940, premiere, Goebbels wrote in his diary that
“‘[t]he film is an incredible success. One hears only enthusiastic responses. The whole room
raves. That’s exactly what I had hoped for.’” 93 Jew Suess is one such “historical film” that
Goebbels purported to stick to historical facts and figures; however, after a brief review of actual
historical facts, one can clearly see that Jew Suess was indeed based more on the Nazi worldview
and their determination to depict Jews as enemy number one.
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Throughout German history, no person has provoked a greater dramatic spectacle than
Joseph Suess Oppenheimer, the main character in Jew Suess. During the reign of Duke Carl
Alexander of Württemberg, Oppenheimer rose to a significant level of influence within the
Duke’s government. Upon the death of the Duke in 1737, Oppenheimer was tried for “high
treason” and was sentenced to death. Out of his trial and execution, Oppenheimer came to be a
part of German collective memory and was known from that point on as “the Jew Suess.” This
offensive name came out of his Jewish identity, obviously, and his earlier nickname as a child,
“Suesskind” (“Sweet child”). This name, combined with extravagant claims and falsifications
about Oppenheimer, thrust his reputation in negative light ever since his trial and subsequent
execution.
Oppenheimer was born in 1698 into a successful merchant family. Throughout his
childhood and early adult life, he became well-trained and informed on business. After he left
home in Vienna in 1732, Oppenheimer met Carl Alexander and soon became his financial
advisor. After the death of his uncle soon thereafter, Carl Alexander became Duke of
Württemberg, and the relationship between the two men continued. Duke Alexander’s reign
brought to Württemberg controversial ideas and reforms, one of which was building up military
forces. Such a goal required substantial financial revenues, and here Oppenheimer “proved
indispensable” to the Duke. By imposing new taxes, Oppenheimer successfully created revenue
for the Duke such that the military forces quadrupled to over ten-thousand men. Oppenheimer’s
service to the Duke earned him substantial wealth and privileges within Württemberg. Notably,
though, Oppenheimer was not the only person in the Duke’s elite ranks who impacted his reign.
Franz Josef von Remchingen was in charge of the Duke’s administration, yet by the end of the
Duke’s brief reign, Remchingen had devised a plan to create a military dictatorship in
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Württemberg. Undoubtedly, this created tension between the Duke’s administration and the
people of Württemberg, and shortly after the Duke’s untimely death, Remchingen was arrested.
As the events unfolded, Remchingen escaped, leaving Oppenheimer to suffer the full wrath of
the people. 94 Though Oppenheimer actually died in the way depicted in the film, his conviction
was a consequence of “abuse of office,” not having sexual relations with Christian women. 95
It is important to note the discrepancies in the actual film versus historical facts. At
Director Veit Harlan’s trial after the end of World War II, prosecutors consulted “115
eighteenth-century documents from the Stuttgart archives” to show unequivocally that his claim
to the historical accuracy of Jew Suess was flawed and a misrepresentation of true events. Harlan
never admitted this fact, and instead, he claimed that the film was “‘not incitement, but rather
artistic representation of the Jewish problem; no distorted picture, but rather an expression of
what is essential, what is human.’” 96
This masterpiece of propaganda, Jew Suess, was meant to inflame feelings and instigate
acts of violence against Jews. Perhaps more importantly, though, is its role in preparing the
German public for the deportations and extermination of millions of Jews throughout Europe. At
the end of the film, this idea is made clear. After the execution of Suess, a decree is made by a
high government official stating, “All Jews must leave Württemberg within three days. No entry
for Jews in the entire realm of Württemberg …May our descendants adhere to this decree, and
thereby be spared suffering for their own well-being and for the sake of their children’s blood.” 97
This statement makes possible the assertion that in order to gain at least the public’s passive
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acceptance of actions to come, Nazi leaders had to build, emphasize, and validate the negative
image of the Jew and the notion of removing Jews from Germany. This effort, as revealed in the
film, is the exclusion of Jews from Württemberg, correlating to the deportation of German Jews
to concentration camps beginning less than one year after the release of the film. Furthermore,
the execution scene of Suess itself provides a link between the film and the subsequent acts of
violence and genocide against Jews. Though the Wannsee Conference had not taken place by
the time this film premiered, the execution and expulsion of Jews at the end of the film helped to
agitate and numb the German public, all under the umbrella of entertainment. Certainly, this film
proved to be an effective propaganda tool as it helped achieve the twin tasks of disseminating
stereotypes as well as measuring the receptiveness of the German public towards possible ways
of solving the “Jewish question.” Jew Suess was the German box office leader in 1940, and by
1943, 20.3 million people (one in three Germans) had seen the film in Reich controlled
theatres. 98
In terms of relating Jew Suess to historical events of the time, it is important to consider
that most historians divide the treatment of Jews in Germany and throughout Europe into three
phases: exclusion from society up to 1938, expulsion to ghettos until 1941, and ultimately
extermination. Given these divisions, Jew Suess belongs to the second period; however, the film
can also be related to the third phase. That is, after Goebbels visited Lodz, Poland, in fall 1939,
he viewed the solution to the “Jewish question” as one requiring radical action; if this did not
happen, Europe would “‘perish with the Jewish disease.’” 99 Growing impatient with the minimal
progress on producing Jew Suess, he replaced the original director and made Veit Harlan
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director. This idea, of course, requires one to view Nazi anti-Jewish policy as evolving over a
period of time. Simply put, extermination was the final stage in a process which initially began in
1939 with the removal of Poles and Jews from Poland. 100 As Robert Edwin Herzstein points out,
“The only difference between the last scene of the film and Nazi genocide was that Jew Suess
dies in public, while the Nazis [for the most part]…murdered the Jews privately.” 101
Yet another perspective of viewing this film is in terms of World War II. The first script
of the film was written just before the invasion of Poland, while the editing process to yield a
final script and early filming took place during the first months of the war. Filming concluded
just after the successful and swift invasion of France, and the film’s premiere took place the
night before the Battle of Britain entered its decisive phase. 102
SD reports on public reaction to viewing Jew Suess note that people believed the
portrayal of Oppenheimer to be “‘frighteningly-real.’” Other responses described the film as
“horrible and authentic, fantastic yet real,” 103 and in Budapest, it was noted that after viewing the
film, some audience members saw a Jew and tore his beard. A former prisoner from the
Sachsenhausen concentration camp even reported that, on at least one occasion, after SS guards
viewed the film, they told Jews under their guard that they now recognized that “the Jews were
even worse than they had thought.” 104
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Plausibly, Jew Suess is the most striking expression of Nazi racial hatred in a narrative
film. The film shows the Jew working diligently to gain at the expense of others. Notably,
dissolves show Suess at one moment to be a bearded, ghetto Jew while in the next to be shaven
and civilized. This particular transformation occurs as Suess makes his way to Stuttgart, and then
at the end of the film during his trial, the dissolve reverses. Ultimately, one can see that the use
of dissolves helps illustrate a key Nazi point: Jews were in fact elusive creatures, and by showing
how they easily morph, it would be possible to educate the audience on the true nature of the
Jewish race. 105 Here, the goal of Nazi propaganda was to reveal the essence of the Jew, and with
his mask uncovered through the use of dissolves, the true Jew was revealed; the propaganda
effort was a success. The expression of the negative image of the Jew as revealed through
Oppenheimer, however, as Eric Rentschler reasons, actually parallels Hitler and Nazi Germany.
Unconsciously, the Nazis actually show themselves in their own anti-Semitic propaganda film.
Suess is portrayed as a man who speaks of political goals, preys on a conflicted state lead by a
weak leader, and employs secret police to achieve goals. Clearly, Suess in the film is relatable to
Hitler. What is perhaps most striking is that in the end, Suess exclaims, “I was nothing more than
a true servant of my sovereign.” 106 This defense bears a striking resemblance to the arguments
justifying the Nazis’ actions given numerous times at the Nuremberg War Tribunals. That is,
many Nazi officials tried to excuse their actions by saying they simply obeyed commands that
were given by higher authorities and the Führer himself. 107
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The Eternal Jew
Compilation film is a genre that defies structure and traditional boundaries of film. By
placing pieces of previous films into new and different thematic contexts, compilation films
appear to be realistic and based on factual evidence. Similar to the case of Jew Suess, a
“historical film,” though, Nazi compilation films also blended whole and part truths with false or
exaggerated interpretations to conform to Party ideology. Even Hilmar Hoffman asserts that “as
far as the Nazis were concerned, this new reality was geared, above all, to its ideological
impact;” 108 thus, historical accuracy was irrelevant.
On November, 28, 1940, the documentary compilation film The Eternal Jew, directed by
Fritz Hippler, premiered in Berlin, just one year before the systematic extermination of Jews
began at camps in Poland. Two versions of the film were shown. The first film, for women and
children, was an abbreviated version without the ritual slaughtering scenes of animals. The
second, full length, film was shown to men and members of the Nazi Party. 109 The Eternal Jew
marks the climax of anti-Semitism in Nazi Germany, as evident in the way Jews are portrayed
throughout the hour long film. Hoffman writes that the film is morally deceitful and the most
“perverse mishmash” ever produced; “only human scum” could produce and support such a
film. 110 The film begins with text stating:
The civilized Jews we know in Germany give but an incomplete picture of their
true character. This film includes actual footage from the Polish ghettos. It shows
us Jews as they really are, before they conceal themselves behind the mask of
civilized Europe. 111
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The first screenshots are indeed from Polish ghettos, but the message conveyed by the
Nazis to audiences is flawed. While the argument is made that these scenes are an example of
Jews in their natural state, one must remember the actual conditions imposed upon Jews by Nazis
at that time. Given the number of Jews forced to live in ghettos, one is hard-pressed to see that
these conditions were not the inherent state of Jewish life and culture, but a life imposed on them
by the Nazi regime. Despite this truth, though, the point Nazis wanted the German people to see
was made clear and real: the “natural state” of Jews was shown truthfully and unedited through
the camera lens. Starvation, disease, and lack of civilized comforts prevailed in the ghettos; these
aspects of Jewish life, despite being a part of a sick and twisted propaganda machine, were
undoubtedly made out to be truths. The constantly perpetuated image of the Jew as a diseasecarrying rat is also exemplified in the ghetto. Propaganda not only reinforced Nazi beliefs, but
also invited the German public into believing the same notion; however, the presence of Jews
and disease in the same location do not warrant the conclusion that Jews are disease-carrying
organisms. Instead, one must realize that disease is a necessary result of cramped and unsanitary
living conditions. Again, such conditions were imposed on the Jewish people; Jews were not
inherent vehicles of disease. Such propaganda efforts are prime examples of how Nazi ideology
was based on fear and the irrational. Director Fritz Hippler even argued in the magazine
Judenfrage that “‘[n]o Jew was forced into any kind of action or position during
shooting…Consequently, we have rendered the ghetto Jews in an unprejudiced manner, real to
life.’” 112
In a November, 29, 1940 article in Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, it is reported that “‘a
sigh of relief’” is breathed when the film ends; the viewer “‘returns to light from the darkest
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swamps.’” 113 Yet another article in Illustrierte Film-Kurier notes that the end of the film “‘fill[s]
the viewer with deepest gratitude that he belongs to this nation whose Führer is in the process of
developing a fundamental solution to the Jewish problem.’” 114 Specifically, the end of the film
shows the return of the ideal Aryan man, a contrast to the Jew who is focused on for the entire
film except the last few minutes of the film. Symbolically, this can be seen as giving hope to the
audience that, through racial purity, a unified Germany would be possible and the future of the
German nation secure. There is also an appearance made by the Führer himself. The film shows
Hitler speaking in front of a large Nazi audience on January, 30, 1939. SD reports from Munich
show that when the film ended, audiences were instantly relieved and even “gave ‘enthusiastic’
applause” during the scene where Hitler warned that a new war would result in the ultimate
destruction of Jews in Europe. Notably, though, the SD reports were not all affirmative. While
positive reactions were reported in the initial weeks and months following the film’s premiere,
SD reports note that some people believed the film “followed too quickly on the feature film Jew
Suess,” 115 which premiered in September, 1940. The report further explains that audiences often
thought the film had “‘nothing really new to say,’” especially after seeing Jew Suess. Some
audience members were even quoted in an SD report saying “‘We’ve had enough of Jewish
filth.’” 116 Consequently, one may agree that those actively involved with the politics and
ideological movement of the Nazi Party were the main seekers of the film, while the average
audience member and citizen “largely avoided it.” SD reports even mention that in some
locations, people actively talked against the film and its “starkly realistic portrait of the Jews.”
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The film in its entirety was viewed as repulsive, and in particular, the ritual slaughter scenes
were mentioned to be “‘the main reason for not seeing the film; ’” some viewers even fainted
during the slaughter scenes. Still yet, The Eternal Jew was shown in every major metropolitan
area in Germany as well as in theatres throughout occupied countries. 117
Like Jew Suess, The Eternal Jew makes use of dissolves to show how Jews supposedly
cleverly disguise themselves and easily transform from typical ghetto-like Jews to persons who
easily resemble civilized humanity. The film shows the Jew as a criminal, Weimar politician,
capitalist, degenerate artist, and radical revolutionary, but despite their true, disgusting identity,
Jews always hid their origins and infiltrated western civilization. Like Oppenheimer, the Jews in
The Eternal Jew are shown to morph by removing skullcaps and kaftans and shaving their hair,
while to make real the claims of Jewish international influence, the film uses the Rothschild
family and shows their “delight” in the way they cheat their host states and avoid taxes. The film
depicts a “web” stretching from Paris to Vienna and London to Naples and Frankfurt, thus giving
visual proof that the Rothschild family successfully integrated into civilized society and obtained
great wealth off the burden of other people.
The exact development of The Eternal Jew is uncertain due to missing information in
Goebbels’ diary between May and October, 1939, but one thing is clear: the outbreak of war on
September 1, 1939, allowed Hitler and others to connect war with the Jews in Poland. The
outbreak of war intimately linked with footage in the beginning of the film from Polish ghettos
unquestionably aided in increasing public hatred toward the Jews. 118 On the flood and spread of
Jews, the narrator informs, “We see a parallel to this in the itinerant routes of rats, which are the
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parasites and bacillus carriers among animals, just as the Jews occupy the same position among
mankind.” 119 Such a statement and the grotesque images that coincide obviously have the
potential to inflame an audience with preexisting notions such as the Germans, and in the opinion
of the Nuremberg court, The Eternal Jew had “‘a decisive influence on the formation of the
German people’s opinion against the Jews.’” Notably, while Hitler may have literally meant
what he said in his prophetic speech on January 39, 1939, Hornshøj-Møller and Culbert contend
that The Eternal Jew in no way intended audiences to accept the idea of murdering Jews. Before
the film’s release in 1940, the “Final Solution” “meant deportation to Poland… [and]
Madagascar.” 120 During the film’s production stage, though, “discussion within interested
political and administrative hierarchies inside Nazi Germany as to the Final Solution changed
dramatically;” thus, while Hornshøj-Møller and Culbert may have a point, it is still reasonable to
assert the film’s role in broadcasting and confirming the reasons for Jewish hatred as well as
creating acceptance of policies that would ultimately bring about mass murder. 121 The peak of
Nazi racism is shown vividly in The Eternal Jew. By arousing emotions through use of the
irrational, the film ultimately “provided the ammunition for a large-caliber anti-Semitic
weapon.” 122 The beginning of genocidal action nearly paralleled the release of this film which
aided the justification of mass murder and helped create acceptance on a massive scale.
Collectively, the films The Eternal Jew and Jew Suess represent a synthesis of the Nazi
vow to exterminate the Jews. Robert Herzstein writes that the two films were “advertisements for
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the ‘Final Solution.’” 123 Why, then, were these two films released in 1940? First, given
Goebbels’ statements in his diary, the two films examined in this thesis, like any other film
released during the Nazi era, went through an exhaustive process of approval and revision,
presumably to perfect their propaganda content and potential value to positively impact the Nazi
cause. This process took time; therefore, the films were conceived prior to 1940 amidst an
evolving propaganda platform that would prove to radicalize and accentuate previous antiSemitism. In relation to historical events, swift victories over Poland and France did not provide
an effective means to solve the “Jewish question.” Instead, acquiring territories beyond Germany
brought even more Jews under Nazi control, thus aggravating the “problem” and urgency to
solve it. Efforts to deport and resettle Jews ultimately failed, and despite the already heightened
level of frustration with the “problem,” Hitler planned on invading Russia, which would
certainly have added millions of more Jews under Nazi occupation. This, along with Great
Britain’s endurance in the war and the official entrance of the United States to the stage in late
1941 only exacerbated the issues and gave cause for Hitler to confirm his belief that an
international “Jewish conspiracy” was at work to destroy Germany. The two films released in
September and November of 1940 are, therefore, a part of the realm of propaganda that was
under total control of Goebbels, and ultimately the Führer himself.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION
The Successes and Failures of Nazi Propaganda
In a speech delivered at the 1934 Nuremberg Party Rally, Goebbels asserted, “‘It may be
good to have power based on weapons. It is better and longer lasting, however, to win and hold
the heart of a people.’” 124 Despite the effectiveness of Nazi propaganda in spreading anti-Semitic
arguments and instilling acceptance of hate toward the Jewish people, it was not totally
successful. Propaganda alone did not and could not help the Nazis secure total victory in World
War II, let alone achieve widespread support for mass murder. Unquestionably, though, millions
were murdered in an effort to solve Germany’s perceived problems, but given the defeat of
Germany at Stalingrad and the ensuing Allied liberation of Europe, Germany and its powerful
propaganda machine could not stop the tide of war from favoring the Allied forces. Given the
events, defeat was delayed, but not inevitable. In The Eternal Jew, the narrator voices, “Jewish
thinking and Jewish blood will never again pollute the German nation. Under the leadership of
Adolf Hitler, Germany has raised the battle flag against the eternal Jew.” 125 In the eyes of Nazis,
war was indeed a struggle for existence; to achieve victory, any and all traces of Jewish physical,
cultural, political, and social existence needed to be removed. As time progressed, Nazi antiSemitic policies evolved from discrimination to ghettoization and later to deportation and
extermination. The prophetic statement made by Hitler in January, 1939, took fruition, and
statements and scenes taken from the two films examined in this thesis also prove vital to an
analysis of the evolution of anti-Semitism in the Third Reich. Strikingly, in October, 1939, when
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The Eternal Jew began production, 230,000 Jews lived in Lodz (where most of the initial scenes
of the film took place), but at its liberation in January, 1945, only 877 Jews remained alive. 126
Implications of Modern Anti-Semitism
Undoubtedly, the ideologies that prevailed and the events that took place during the Nazi
era had monumental effects on Jews, the German people, and the entirety of mankind. Over six
million Jews perished as a result of an evolved and radicalized Nazi plan to rid Europe of the socalled “Jewish question.” In total, tens of millions of people died as a result of World War II,
thus making it the deadliest conflict in human history. 127 While some leaders of the Nazi Party
were held accountable for their actions and involvement in crimes against humanity at the
Nuremberg Trials held after the war, the existence of virulent and deceptive propaganda still
exists in today’s world. By visiting the United States Holocaust Museum, one can view an
exhibit on Nazi propaganda where the many things discussed in this thesis are visible to the eye
and come to life. Part of the exhibit, though, makes apparent the link between propaganda and
genocide post World War II in other countries such as Uganda, and while some Americans may
be quick to argue that our country is separated far from the attitudes and events that took place in
Nazi Germany, it is of utmost importance to take a careful look at our own history and current
affairs. I am not asserting in the least that the United States is similar to a Germany run by the
Nazi Party, but I do argue that, like the German public, the American public is largely informed
of political and military affairs by means of mass communication. While these agencies are not
controlled, per say, by a political party like the German press and film industries were, they do in
fact often identify themselves as broadcasting either a liberal or conservative agenda. This
division between competing ideologies in America, whether intentional or not, can certainly give
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rise to extremism on both sides. A contrast to Nazi Germany where only state approved
information could be circulated or broadcast, Americans enjoy the freedoms of press and speech;
however, when extremists abuse these freedoms for the purpose of forwarding a cause that could
potentially cause harm, we as a society must take note and demand change. A citizenry informed
of the truth combined with responsible media reporting is of utmost importance. Racism,
discrimination, and hatred at all levels must be taken seriously and prevented. In particular to
anti-Semitism, one cannot deny its existence across the globe. Just recently, a short “remake”
version of The Eternal Jew was released on YouTube. The original 1940 film is troubling for its
virulent content and manipulative effect such that it abetted the genocide of millions of people,
but perhaps more significant to today’s society is the fact that such a film has been used to help
other extremists spread their message of hate to a potential worldwide audience. The idea of film
as a weapon seems rather absurd, since it is not a weapon capable of firing bullets and tearing
through flesh. Yet, as the events that unfolded in Nazi Germany show, films were valued for
their ability to help further Nazi policies and the desire to eradicate Europe of the influences of
Jewry. Film can indeed be used as a weapon, and we should not be so dismissive of the same
idea in today’s world. The notion that “not every human being with a face is a human being” 128
still exists today, and chillingly, it is a very real idea that has the potential to permeate to future
generations.
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